The early stage of the Julu Army's counterattack plan is now over. After many days of marching, the counterattack teams from various places have moved at least two to three hundred miles away. This means that it took as long as a month for the Julu Army to counterattack.

The paths that had only taken time to explore were all completed, and there was no intelligence support any further. Each department needed to rely on its extremely scarce scout cavalry to explore the direction in an unfamiliar territory, and the intelligence problem suddenly became difficult.

You can imagine how difficult it is to march and fight without even familiarizing yourself with the road. If this were done at the beginning of the counterattack, the entire counterattack plan would probably come to an end.

Each unit is a brand new army, from the commander down to the country soldiers. It is their first expedition. They lack the anticipation of various complex situations, the means to deal with them, and the experience. In the early stages of the march, even their morale is at a loss.

Unstable.

Then, after many days of marching, various ministries generally encountered various problems. In the process of overcoming various problems, the new army team became mature rapidly. In terms of morale, at the beginning of the march, the rural soldiers walked on the road with fear and fear, and some

They were extremely afraid of any disturbance. When the march lasted for a while, the rural soldiers gradually discovered that the march was not difficult, and their morale became stable.

After the initial training, the teams of each unit began to mature and their morale became stable. At this time, the previously explored route happened to be completed. Going further down, it was up to each unit to explore the path and identify the direction, and the path exploration collected

Intelligence and other matters were extremely difficult, and they were placed on the shoulders of the new armies of various ministries, directly causing huge problems to each ministry.

But at this time, the rural soldiers in various places had made great progress. After marching for many days, everyone from the commander to the ordinary soldiers had received necessary training. Intelligence issues were only a big problem for a few days in the morning, and the Julu Army was no longer a problem.

Staying ahead of the crisis for once.

The overall war situation tends to be favorable to the Julu Army. The longer the time goes on, the more experienced the new army will be and the stronger its combat power will be. The new army has a low foundation, so it will advance quickly, while the rebel army cannot make much progress in a short period of time.

, the time advantage lies with the Julu Army.

Secondly, from a geographical perspective, the Julu Army's counterattack team formed a huge encirclement at the outermost perimeter and marched from the outside in. As time went by, the encirclement gradually shrank, and therefore, the Julu Army's troops became increasingly dense.

On the third and fourth days of the march, a small number of teams started to meet and merge into one on the road. By the seventh and eighth days, more teams had gathered together. By the middle of the month, more and more teams were marching on the road.

Most of them are teams composed of multiple rural soldiers.

In the process of gathering troops, the strength of each unit increased from a few hundred, to more than a thousand, to two to three thousand, or even more. As the number of troops increased, the combat power also expanded rapidly.

Since the day when various ministries started to counterattack, the major problems faced by the rural soldiers are: first, insufficient troops and weak combat power; second, insufficient scouts and insufficient intelligence, making it difficult to identify the road. As the march progressed, the encirclement gradually became more difficult.

By shrinking, more and more troops can be gathered. As time goes by, the strength advantage of the rural soldiers will become greater and greater.

As the march progresses, the problem of difficult road identification becomes less and less of a problem. The encirclement is shrinking, and the area in the encirclement is gradually decreasing. Naturally, the further you go, the fewer roads there are, and the roads that need to be detected are simpler.

The detection efficiency will be higher. Assume that at the outermost edge of the encirclement, there are twenty forks that need to be explored every ten miles. When you go to the back, the number of forks will become fifteen or ten, and the directions will become more and more

It became clear that at the same time, more and more scouts were gathering, and the manpower for investigation became more and more free.

It can be said that as time goes by, like a snowball, marching becomes easier and easier, and the difficulty of marching decreases faster and faster.

This reveals an exquisite strategic arrangement.

In a hypothetical scenario, two parties are engaged in a war in a vast area that crosses states and counties. The retreat routes of the two sides are very different. One party has only one retreat behind it, while the other side has roads extending in all directions behind it. In such a situation, if they are defeated, there is no doubt that there is only one retreat behind them.

When one side of the same road is defeated, all the defeated soldiers flee along the same road. In this way, it becomes easy to gather the remaining soldiers and reorganize the troops.

On the other side, behind it, roads extend in all directions. Once the army is defeated, the defeated army will be scattered in a mess along the horizontal and vertical roads, making it extremely difficult to reorganize and fight again.

The attribute of war lies in "change" rather than "unchanged", and geographical conditions partly determine the trend of change.

A road extending in all directions is very different from an isolated road, and a road extending in all directions is also very different from a road extending in all directions.

The road network either diverges forward or shrinks forward. When marching, there is no doubt that if a group of soldiers and horses walks on the road network that shrinks forward, their troops will become more concentrated as they move forward, and they will have an advantage as they move forward.

On the other side of the divergent road network, the troops are becoming more and more dispersed.

Comparing the two, the advantages and disadvantages are clear.

Just like this Julu Army.

The grand battle plan of the Julu Army may also explain why the side surrounded is at a disadvantage, while the side surrounded by the outside is at an advantage.

The forces of the encircled party are more concentrated as they move inwards, and naturally have a tendency to gather. The forces of the surrounded party, on the other hand, push outward and have a natural tendency to disperse. This is why, when encircling, there is often a tendency for the encircling forces not to gather together.

They will be defeated one by one, and the encircled party can often defend its defense, but once the counterattack is instantly defeated. The fundamental reason for this is that the encircled party is tending to gather together, and the sooner the encircled party is interrupted, the better;

As for the besieged side, the trend is dispersing, so staying still is the safest option. A rash counterattack will be more risky.

It is rumored that Go masters can often see three or even ten moves in their next move. The same is true in war. The battle situation changes rapidly. It is impossible to predict the changing battlefield situation in advance, which is not enough to deal with complex situations.

Regarding this point, [Geographic factors determine changes in battlefield trends], if one day we fight the enemy and the enemy has only one avenue to retreat, then even if the enemy is defeated, even if the enemy is routed, there is only one way for the enemy to retreat.

Broken troops must also flee on a road. Therefore, although the enemy is routed, but its manpower is still there, it is extremely possible for the enemy to reorganize its manpower and make a comeback.

This chapter is not finished yet, please click on the next page to continue reading the exciting content! Therefore, before attacking and defeating the enemy, you must also be prepared for a thunderous pursuit, crushing any possibility of the enemy's regrouping with a thunderous force.

.

On the other hand, if one's own troops are weak and the defeated side is defeated, then it is known that it is easy for our scattered troops to reunite, and it is easy to gather and rise again. Therefore, whenever fighting on an isolated road, we can gather troops on the back road in preparation.

When the army is defeated.

An army with tens of thousands of people only needs to leave a recruiting team of more than 200 people. These 200 people are all junior officers, and the 200 people are equipped with a complete set of flags. It only costs 200 manpower to win the battle.

When a mountain falls, the army can regroup as quickly as possible and fight again.

Furthermore, even though I have the advantage of gathering my defeated troops along a single road, if the enemy's troops press forward quickly and suppress the situation of defeat, I will be in danger of annihilating my entire army.

When the roads were open in all directions, the defeated troops scattered and fled, and one or two troops could still survive. But when there was a single road, thousands of troops had no way to escape.

From this, there is another way to counterattack. Since our defeated troops on the lonely road are easily followed by the enemy and killed from beginning to end, then we must stop the enemy's pursuit.

The problem comes again. In order to stop the pursuing troops, combat manpower must be left behind. This also involves the issue of weight. The same troops are far more useful if they are deployed on the front line than staying behind to prepare for emergencies.

The purpose of leaving behind defensive forces is to use a small amount of troops to make a big difference, and to use a small amount of troops to exchange for the possibility of resurrecting the defeated army and making huge profits. Therefore, the number of troops left behind must not be too many.

The number of troops is small, and the enemy must be stopped. At this time, the way to use a small number of troops to exert more effect is to find ways outside of the strength of the troops, such as vehicle formations and barriers. Then there is a solution.

It just so happens that isolated roads are isolated and a lonely road is convenient for building barriers, but the case of forked roads is different. Roads with many forked roads need to build barriers at each branch, and this requires a lot of manpower, which is different from the original idea of ​​being small and broad.

contrary to purpose.

There are two ways to build a barrier in the isolated road behind you to prevent unexpected events. One is the combination of manpower, the other is the combination of geography, and the combination of manpower is. It happens that a small amount of manpower must rely on barriers to stop the enemy's pursuit.

The ability, and the combination of geography, are just right, there is only one lonely road, and only one fortification can be built to block all incoming enemies. The amount of work is small, and it just matches the small amount of manpower.

At this point, the defeated side has a barrier to protect it from being killed from head to toe, so it is possible to gather its troops and make a comeback.

On the contrary, if we consider it from the perspective of the attacker, it is naturally best to send light and fast cavalry to pursue the defeated army. However, there is a barrier across the enemy's back road, and the cavalry is eager to attack. The cavalry is unable to attack the city and break out the stronghold.

The pursuit had to be interrupted.

In order to counter the defender's barriers, it is best for the pursuing cavalry to carry siege equipment so that they can attack the barriers. However, normal siege equipment is generally extremely bulky and almost impossible for the cavalry to carry.

At this time, the cavalry may not need to carry large equipment. Because in this situation, the defender wants to be small and broad, so the number of troops stationed in the rear must be small and the number of people is small, so it is impossible to build a too tall and strong cavalry.

Barriers, therefore, small instruments are sufficient to defeat them.

According to the consistent technical thinking of the Julu Army, the Julu Army already has a detachable folding ladder. Naturally, in order for the cavalry to have the ability to attack barriers, a detachable ladder will be specially prepared for the cavalry or for special operations.

An exquisite small siege equipment, one equipment is divided into dozens of parts and carried by dozens of cavalry respectively. Once encountering an enemy barrier blocking the road, the cavalry dismounts and instantly assembles the parts into an attack equipment, without waiting for the enemy to make a move.

The reaction, with the help of the power of equipment, can be broken through in an instant. Only in this way can all possibilities of a comeback be eliminated when the defeated party has barriers.

On the other hand, there are too many ways for the defeated side to counter the weapons of the pursuing side. The chasing troops only have cavalry and a very small amount of ultra-light equipment. However, the simplest way to counterattack is that the defeated side only needs to use weapons.

Arrange one or two equipment at the barrier in advance, and use serious equipment against the opponent's micro equipment. There is no doubt that it will be completely suppressed.

In a specific scenario of fighting on an isolated road, pursuit and defeat, time is in favor of the defeated side, but is urgent for the pursuing side. In this scenario, the defeated side has barriers to stop them, and the defeated side only needs to hold the routed troops where they are.

It is done in waves, while the chasing side needs to be very quick and slow, and wait for the defeated side to calmly gather its troops. The more troops it gathers, the more manpower it has, and the more people it has, the easier it is to gather its troops.

, the easier it is to gather troops, the more manpower there is, the easier it is to gather...

This is a snowball-like accumulation of advantages. Once the possibility of the defeated party's reunion is not eliminated in time, the defeated party will regain its combat power in an instant.

In short, as a metaphor, it is not difficult for 100,000 people to break through a barrier, but it is very difficult for 100,000 people to break through the barrier in a short period of time. In the face of time disadvantage, the human advantage cannot be brought into play at all.

From this, it may be concluded that the battle to win or lose in a war is not about the number of people or how long the battle lasts, but about the amount of work done.

A hundred thousand people can't attack a city in one day, but ten thousand people can attack it in ten days. The fundamental reason is that during the siege process, whether it is a hundred thousand people or ten thousand people, the city cannot be broken.

It is impossible to fully invest all the troops, that is, to a certain extent, the manpower investment efficiency of 100,000 sieges and 10,000 sieges is the same.

Since the manpower investment efficiency is the same, then 100,000 people attacking the city in one day will have the same damage to the defenders as 10,000 people attacking the city in one day. How long does it take for 10,000 people to attack the city to cause enough damage to the city? The same goes for 100,000 people.

time.

From this, one of the fundamental laws of war is highlighted. The way to defeat the opponent is to prevent the opponent from achieving the established strategic goals.

Based on this principle, methods to destroy the enemy's strategic purpose include reducing the enemy's combat efficiency, such as barriers. Barriers sometimes do not necessarily bring tactical advantages to the defender, but if they limit the deployment of enemy forces,

It doesn't matter even if the two sides exchange up to one to one - as long as the enemy's delivery efficiency is low enough, so low that it can only deliver one man per day, then the defender will only lose one troop per day. Based on this calculation, a 5,000-man army will

In a city, if the attacker loses one person in one day, it would take more than 5,000 days and more than ten years to consume all the people in the city.

This is a method of destroying the enemy's strategic purpose by reducing the enemy's combat efficiency.

In addition, reducing the enemy's combat time can also cause the enemy's defeat.

For example, if there is a strong army of 100,000 soldiers, and this army can fully exert its combat power, then it will use the method of starving the enemy to attack the enemy's food and grass, so that the enemy's combat time will be greatly shortened. Then, then, ten

An army of ten thousand people with extremely high combat efficiency suffers from insufficient combat time. No matter how efficient it is, the overall results it can achieve are still extremely limited.

Efficiency is enough to illustrate some basic core principles. In physics, the formula for work is: work efficiency x work time = total amount of work.

Is war a work of merit?

Of course so.

Since war is work, the formula is the same. Whether it is changing the work efficiency or the time of work, it will affect the total amount of work.

The total amount of work done is the damage done to people, the extent of damage to the city, the impact on morale, etc. There is a unified formula for achieving all these results. The size of the results depends on efficiency and time.
Chapter completed!