The Great Ross, which has world influence, is one of the few countries with a system of war, but Russia's strategic defense system is inherently deficient.,

It is undeniable that Russia has a brilliant space history, the first to launch artificial satellites, the first to send astronauts into space, the first to build an orbital space station, etc. However, as the Red Empire collapsed in the early 1990s, Russia, which inherited its legacy, did not carry forward the space industry, but instead became increasingly weak.

Although at the beginning of the century, relying on the legacy of the former Soviet Union and low launch costs, Russia was very glorious in the international aerospace field. For example, the construction of the international space station led by the United States and Europe was mostly undertaken by Russia. However, at the end of the era, with the Republic taking the lead in commercial application of controllable fusion nuclear power plants, the cost of space launches has rapidly decreased. Russia no longer has a cost advantage, and its status in the international aerospace field plummeted, and coupled with the Great Depression that lasted for more than ten years. By the end of the era, Russia had no advantage in the international aerospace field.

It can be said that if it were not for the support of the state and had the largest resource treasure house in the world, Russia was not even a space power. For example, as early as the early era, the Republic and the United States eliminated traditional chemical-fuel rocket engines and comprehensively promoted hydrogen and oxygen rocket engines, reducing the cost of space launch by an order of magnitude. European space companies also launched the "Ariana 7" large-thrust launch vehicle using new hydrogen and oxygen rocket engines in the second half of the terrorist era, and joined the "low-cost space club". Russia did not launch a new hydrogen and oxygen rocket engine until the beginning of the era. It was not until the beginning of the era that it launched a launch vehicle with a new hydrogen and oxygen rocket engine with a low-Earth orbit carrying capacity of less than 2 tons. After many years, it was not until the end of the year that it launched the first large-scale launch vehicle with a low-Earth orbit carrying capacity exceeding that of stew, and officially joined the "low-cost space club".

There is only one reason why Russia is struggling in the aerospace field, that is, the backward power technology.

As we all know, the key to the new ammonia oxygen rocket is not the rocket engine, but the cheap acquisition of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, that is, how to reduce the cost of electricity. There is only one reliable solution, namely, comprehensively promoting and popularizing controllable fusion nuclear power plants and replacing other power plants. It can be said that the low-cost aerospace era was able to arrive in the era of the century because controllable fusion nuclear power plants began to be popularized in the era of blades, which made the power supply develop towards infinite development, and the electricity price infinitely approached zero, thus reducing the production cost of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen to near zero.

It must be admitted that the more resources the better.

Because of its richest natural resources in the world, Russia has survived its most difficult years.

When gradually fading out of the international aerospace launch market, in order to ensure national security, the Russian authorities have always encouraged aerospace companies to innovate independently through government subsidies, and provided orders for aerospace companies by promoting the construction of national strategic defense systems. The problem is that government support cannot improve production efficiency and cannot reduce the launch cost. Faced with high launch costs, when building a national strategic defense system, Russia is naturally not as rich as it looks. It is careful to calculate in all aspects and minimize system costs. Because the main reason for the high cost is space launch, the first thing the Russian authorities think of is to reduce the number of launches. To be precise, it is to reduce the system quality and use the minimum launch volume to form strategic defense. Because the main reason for the high cost is space launch, the first thing that the Russian authorities think of is to reduce the number of launches. To be precise, it is to reduce the system quality and use the minimum launch volume to form strategic defense.

General.

This is not an impossible thing, but the actual meaning is certainly in the business world.

As we all know, the strategic defense system itself is the "money-burning machine" of the superpower. According to the data officially released by the Republic, the national strategic defense system is divided into three major stages and eight stages, with a total investment of one trillion yuan in total. Even if inflation factors are deducted, it is calculated as a 0 trillion yuan in 2 fields. It is equivalent to the positive times of the Republic's GDP in that year. Although the US authorities did not provide exact statistics, the total investment in its national missile defense system will not be much lower. Calculated in the annual currency, between the trillion-dollar and the fierce trillion-dollar US dollars, it is about the times of the United States' GDP that year.

The problem is that huge investment is a problem, and the Republic and the United States are another problem.

In fact, as early as when the national strategic defense system and national missile defense system were planned and designed, relevant experts from the Republic and the United States proposed that the system design is too complex, which will inevitably lead to high construction costs. If the system integration can be appropriately improved, it will greatly reduce expenditures without significantly reducing the system's interception capability. Because these two sets of the world's most powerful strategic defense systems are designed to leave appropriate redundancy according to the situation changes. For example, when designing a strategic defense system, it is required to intercept and relax force at one time.

Targets can be intercepted in batches to deal with tens of thousands of targets. When they are completed, even if nuclear countries such as the United States, Russia, France, Britain, Israel, and Pakistan simultaneously launch an attack on the Republic, as long as they fail to launch all strategic missiles within minutes, to be precise, all strategic carriers carrying nuclear warheads cannot enter the scope of attacking the Republic's mainland within minutes, and the national strategic defense system can intercept them all. And the overall interception success rate is no less than that, which is equivalent to the fact that only the Jumei warhead escapes when attacked by the Concave-Li-Nuclear Warhead.

Because behind the national strategic defense system is the theater guide defense system knife and missile interception system. The interception efficiency of these two systems on incoming targets is more than the world's most common warheads. Therefore, among the auxiliary warheads that escape the net, at most, only one warhead can fall and explode over important targets in the Republic. Judging from the standards of world warfare, even if the attack is a megacity city, it will not have much impact on the Republic's war potential.

Similarly, the United States' national missile defense system, as well as the theater missile defense system at the combat and tactical level, and the battlefield missile defense system also have similar interception capabilities, which basically ensure that the losses are reduced to a range that can be withstood when subjected to a full-scale nuclear strike.

Because nuclear powers all pursue a bundled policy. That is, when conducting strategic strikes, they will never only target the enemy countries. They will also carry out devastating strikes on other nuclear powers, nuclear countries, and even countries that are capable of producing nuclear weapons to ensure that no country can immediately manufacture nuclear weapons after the nuclear war and become the world hegemon. Therefore, in a comprehensive nuclear war, neither the Republic nor the United States will be able to face a comprehensive attack by other nuclear powers and nuclear countries. In other words, if a nuclear war really breaks out, the nuclear warheads that explode on the republic will definitely not be too involved.

It can be seen that improving system integration and appropriately reducing interception capabilities will not have a substantial impact on national security.

The problem is that neither the Republic nor the United States did this.

The reason is very simple. Among the problems caused by improving system integration, reducing interception capabilities is only one and only a secondary impact. From the perspective of military systems, the biggest impact of improving integration on the strategic defense system should be to reduce the reliability of the system, that is, the system's survivability.

As we all know, the strategic defense system is the cornerstone of security of major powers and the survival guarantee of major powers in a total war.

Such an important military system is definitely the target of attack. This is the case in reality. While building a strategic defense system, the Republic and the United States regard destroying the opponent's strategic defense system as the top priority, otherwise they will not develop the offensive capabilities of the strategic defense system. In this way, when both sides develop the strategic defense system in a direction of both offense and defense, they must strive to improve the survivability of the system itself. In fact, it is precisely for this reason that the fundamental reason why neither the Republic nor the United States gave up the air-based and ground-based sea-based interception system when the space-based interception system has the best combat effectiveness and can complete the defense mission at the lowest cost without being attacked. You must know that the space-based interception system is the worst survivability among all subsystems and the one that is most easily hit. If all hopes are placed on one subsystem, it cannot be called a strategic defense system.

The problem is that the space-based interception system does have the highest combat efficiency.

Affected by this, the Republic and the United States have not only not given up the space-based interception system, but are also trying to improve the survivability of the space-based interception system. The main method is to increase the system redundancy and deploy it in a scattered manner, and even if some facilities are damaged, they still have considerable interception capabilities.

It can be said that this is also the fundamental reason why the construction cost of Tianjun remains high.

Take the space-based interception system of the Republic's National Strategic Defense System as an example. The interception part is composed of an in-orbit satellite. Adding to the detection system, communication system, calibration system, deception system, etc. Today, the in-orbit satellite of the basic interception system exceeds the young ones. Among these satellites, most of them require orbital maneuverability and in-orbit working hours above the old year, so the average mass of the satellite is above the old town, the largest of which is more than 3, and the most is also ton. On average, the total mass of the Xinkou satellite is

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Even according to the calculation, the cost of satellite launches per year is as high as tens of billions of yuan. In addition to the manufacturing cost of the satellite itself, the maintenance cost of the ground system, personnel cost, etc., the average annual maintenance cost of the space-based intercept system is as high as tens of billions of yuan, which is equivalent to one percent of the GDP of the Tiananian Republic. If it is just a one-time investment, it is not a big problem. What's bad is that this is continuous investment, that is, the GDP of the GDP is used every year to maintain the space-based intercept system for decades, let alone Russia. Even the Republic cannot afford it.

It can be seen that for Russia, the only way to build a strategic defense system is to shrink it.

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Because the space-based interception system accounts for the majority of the strategic defense system, controlling the scale of the space-based interception system, that is, improving the system integration, has become the only choice for the Russian authorities. To put it bluntly, with Russia's strength, even if the Russian authorities know that doing so is equivalent to destroying the Great Wall, they can only bear the pain of giving up, otherwise they can only give up the space-based interception system, which is equivalent to giving up the national strategic defense capabilities.

On the premise of trying to ensure the interception capability of the system, improving the integration must start with reducing the auxiliary system. I mean integrating the auxiliary system that does not need to exist separately into the interception and prevention of the hunger. In order to reduce the space launch volume and future maintenance costs. To give a simple example, Russia's space-based interception system does not have a separate calibration satellite, but relies on the global positioning satellite system and the setting of ground positioning stations for intercepting satellite positioning. For example, Russia's space-based interception system does not have a separate communication system.

Instead, it ensures the information exchange capability between systems by setting special commands for the military communication satellite network. The communication channels of the intercept system are given priority. In fact, the detection system and the deception system also rely on the original military satellite, or are directly integrated into the intercept satellite, and no separate system is formed. In other words, Russia's space-based intercepting system is actually a single defense system with only the intercepting system. Mu Yong doubts. The survivability of this intercepting system similar to the commander of the bare rod is definitely not very good.

That's why some Russian generals claimed that the Russian authorities repeatedly reduced their investment in the national strategic defense system and were joking about national security.

Before the past years, the problem of strategic defense systems had not attracted the attention of Russian top leaders.

It was not until last year's Kazakhstan incident that the Russian authorities realized that a reliable strategic defense system was the key force in ensuring Russia's national security. Against this background, the Russian army organized a targeted exercise, and the conclusion was that in a total war, Russia's strategic defense system had no chance of survival. Although the results of this exercise immediately attracted high attention from the Russian authorities, it was related to Russia's national security, so it was not announced. Moreover, it was difficult to substantially improve the survival ability of the strategic defense system in just over the past year. Before the war broke out, all problems were still hidden under the water.

After the war started, all problems emerged. Because the military communication satellite system was attacked and was in a state of total paralysis, the Russian Sky Army Command was unable to place attack instructions on the intercepting satellite system at all. That is to say, in just a few minutes, the most important part of the Russian strategic defense system became a decoration. More importantly, after the communications process went wrong, the Russian Sky Army Command not only could not understand the situation of other military satellite systems, but also did not dare to launch a strategic counterattack rashly. Although it only took a few minutes to contact the Kerry Demonic Forest, in just a few minutes, Russia's Junzhuo satellite system suffered a devastating blow. This naturally includes the intercepting satellites in the space-based intercepting system.

At the Moscow time point, Chiliakov received a call from the commander of the Heavenly Army Dukov. Although the Russian president's second reaction was that the most important strategic system was suddenly hit, and according to the national strategic counterattack procedure, it should be necessary to launch a counterattack, that is, to carry out a retaliatory strategic strike against the Republic, but before speaking, Chiliakov calmed down because he knew that if it was not a system failure, but a strategic strike by the Republic, then Russia's strategic revenge would become the reason for the Republic's comprehensive strategic strike. Fighting the strength of strategic strikes. Russia is far inferior to the Republic. Fighting for strategic defense, Russia is even less than that of the Republic. If it really needs to be launched in full, I am afraid that all strategic ballistic missiles fired at the Republic will explode over Russia's homeland, and all strategic ballistic missiles fired at Russia will also bloom on the land of Russia.

In other words, strategic revenge is actually self-destruction.

After calming down, Chelyakov issued the first order, which was to thoroughly investigate the cold state of the military satellite system and determine the damage.

When this order was issued, Chiliakov was already rushing to the subway at the strategic command center.

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After the famous point, Chiliakov contacted Jodnovic, who was urgently taken to another strategic command center, and other key personnel who were given priority care, and urgently consulted with everyone about the current situation.

Due to the intense situation, after a minute of discussion, Chiliakov issued the highest strategic mobilization order, allowing the strategic forces of the Russian Army, Navy, Air Force and Sky Army to enter the highest combat readiness state, that is, to be prepared to launch an attack and be able to launch a missile immediately after receiving the order.

There is no doubt that this is not a simple command.

Russia still owns hundreds of strategic ballistic missiles, several strategic submarines, dozens of strategic bombers, and thousands of nuclear warheads carried by these carriers. If stored, the nuclear warheads that have not yet been destroyed and tactical nuclear warheads are not to be seen.

The question is, will the Republic take it lightly in the face of such a terrifying force that can destroy the entire human civilization?

From the perspective of the Republic, after the war begins, destroying Russia's strategic strike capabilities will definitely be the first priority, and attacking Russia's military satellite systems is only the first step. To achieve the goal, we must continue to work hard, such as completely destroying Russia's strategic weapon system.

To destroy Russia's strategic weapon system, we must determine the exact location of Russia's strategic weapon system.
Chapter completed!