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Volume Fourteen, Smoke of Gunpowder, Chapter 68, The Most Important Victory(1/2)

, No one in the second steward is... the importance of luck in naval battles cannot be denied...

It can be said that any naval battle that can be written into historical books has luck, and the effect of luck often exceeds other factors. For example, in the Midway Battle of World War II, a water reconnaissance aircraft on the cruiser of the Japanese Combined Fleet "Ligan" failed to take off on time due to mechanical failure, and the US fleet was on the reconnaissance route of the reconnaissance aircraft. The Japanese Combined Fleet was also suddenly attacked by the opponent because it was unable to detect the close-to-earth US fleet in time. In the end, it was defeated and returned in a disastrous defeat.

In the "Maldives Naval Battle, luck also played an equally important role.

As mentioned earlier, when the commander of the Indian Ocean Fleet was hesitating whether to send an attack aircraft group according to the target information provided by the Indian Ocean Theater Command, a long-range maritime patrol aircraft through the air defense network discovered the US fleet and sent the target coordinate information before being shot down, so that the commander of the Indian Ocean Fleet no longer had to hesitate and also allowed the attack aircraft group of the Indian Ocean Fleet to fly directly to the target.

There is no doubt that this is the component of luck.

Conversely, when the problem occurs on the US military, the luck factor cannot be ignored.

At that time, the US military commander was indeed very hesitant. The reason was very simple. When the target was unable to determine the sea area where the target was located, if you blindly sent out an attack aircraft group, you may waste too much fuel when looking for the target, or fly too far in the wrong direction, which eventually leads to the ineffective attack, or the inability to return to the fleet after the attack. The US fleet commander cares not about hundreds of fighter jets, but about hundreds of pilots. You should know that cultivating an excellent pilot with thousands of hours of flight experience is a hundred times more difficult than building a fighter jet. It can even be said that if a pilot who lost too much in the early stage of the war, it will inevitably have an impact on the combat effectiveness of the navy.

At this moment, the US military's radio detection equipment discovered a very weak signal.

In less than half a minute, the central computer on the flagship conducted a comprehensive analysis of the signal and determined it to be connected to the radio signal sent by the helping equipment on the carrier-based fighter of the Republic's Navy. More importantly, these two signals are in the waters of the Maldives Islands, not only very close, but also the distance to the US fleet will not exceed the merit kilometer. It is very likely to be around kilometers.

It has to be admitted that the detection accuracy of the US military's electronic reconnaissance equipment is very high.

Of course, it has to be admitted that designs that are considered safety will become safety hazards at times.

The two radio signals were indeed sent by the carrier-based fighter jet of the Republic Navy, and were sent by the fighter jet that crashed due to a fault after taking off. Judging from the situation at that time, it was definitely not the radio signals sent by the pilot for help.

The reason is very simple. The fleet commander did not announce the lifting of radio control, and the warships were contacted by laser directional communication systems. More importantly, the fighter jets malfunctioned after taking off, and strictly followed the code to carry out emergency landings on the sea behind the fleet. Under normal circumstances, the fleet would definitely dispatch vertical take-off and landing aircraft and patrol and standby nearby. The mission of these aircraft was to rescue pilots who fell into the water.

According to the combat records of the Republic Navy, after receiving the fighter's crash landing, two vertical take-off and landing aircraft rushed over and rescued the pilot. The two pilots also mentioned in the subsequent report that they did not start the radio call system after the crash. It can be seen that it must be the automatic control system on the fighter that activated the radio call system and sent out a radio signal.

This is also easy to understand. As early as Tiannian, the US Navy installed an automatic take-off and landing system on carrier-based fighters. Take-off and landing are no longer controlled by the pilot, which greatly improves the take-off and landing efficiency and take-off and landing safety. Before Lilinian, that is, when building the "Shanghai" class aircraft carrier, the Republic's Navy also used this system on the new generation of carrier-based fighters. Because the probability of failure during take-off and landing is much higher than normal flight, at this time, the automatic control system will activate the emergency assistance equipment on the fighter.

Although technically, the radio call system can be turned off manually, the two crashed fighters are performing attack missions. Whether it is a pilot or an aircraft carrier, it is impossible to turn off the radio call system on the fighter. The reason is very simple. If the fighter is shot down by an enemy plane during combat and falls into the sea hundreds of kilometers away from the aircraft carrier or even thousands of kilometers, the system must be higher to send the coordinates so that the aircraft performing the rescue mission can come over as fast as possible and rescue the pilot.

That's why the radio call system works very far and is easily discovered even if the signal strength is not high.

Now, it is not difficult to understand why the US fleet close to 1,000 meters away can find these two very weak signals.

Of course, the central computer of the US military's flagship also gave relatively clear analysis results.

For the commander of the US fleet, another situation was also considered, that is, the commander of the Indian Ocean Fleet deliberately set up a maze array, hoping to use these two radio call signals to lead the attack aircraft group of the US fleet to the wrong direction, thus causing the US military to miss the opportunity to counterattack.

The question is, do U.S. military commanders have other options?

As mentioned earlier, in terms of probability, the possibility of the Republic's Indian Ocean Fleet appearing in the Maldives Islands is as high as 80%, and the US reconnaissance aircraft have searched the waters east of the archipelago. No Republic's fleet has been found. Although, in theory, the Republic's Indian Ocean Fleet may also sail westward, that is, chase the trajectory of the Fourth Fleet and the Eighth Fleet and go around the west of the battlefield. However, when the orientation of the South China Sea Fleet is roughly determined, let alone naval generals. Even the most ordinary naval soldiers know that the Indian Ocean Fleet will not move westward, because there is a search for US shore-based long-range maritime patrol aircraft deployed in Djibouti and the Seychelles.

.

More importantly, from the timing of the two signals, it can be roughly determined. It is indeed a radio call signal sent by the crashed fighter.

Affected by these factors, the US commander did not hesitate anymore. Less than 4 minutes after the departure of the two attack aircraft fleets sent by the Indian Ocean Fleet, the fighter planes parked on the aircraft carrier flight deck took off at the fastest speed.

Of course, the US commander did not adjust the attack tactics determined previously. Fanfanji. The first one to take off was air defense fighter jets. When the US commander issued the attack abyss. Qin air defense fighter jets that performed fleet air defense missions had formed seven aircraft groups and turned north. Although the remaining fuel of these fighters was not enough to return to the fleet, the US commander had arranged for the vertical take-off and landing patrol aircraft on the escort warship to take off with a partner refueling pod to provide fuel supplies for the escort fighter jets that were leaving the front when they returned.

From a time perspective, the US military dispatched only about a minute later than the Republic fleet.

Even if all the U.S. multi-purpose fighters that were performing attack missions did not take off until the old point, they were only minutes later than the attack aircraft fleet of the Republic Fleet.

If it were in the beginning of the century, this time would be nothing.

The problem is that in the late 2000s, blade minutes was enough to determine the fate of the two fleets.

For heavy air combat fighters with cruise speeds of Mach, flying at a high altitude of 1,000 meters is only a matter of more than a few minutes of force. Even if the time of climbing and acceleration after takeoff is counted, it will not exceed the blade minute. From this, it can be seen that the US military's luck is indeed good. Judging from the situation at that time, if the US military commander adopted conventional tactics, that is, let the fighters on the aircraft carrier perform forward escort missions, then the US fleet would be attacked before all fighters performing attack missions take off. More importantly, the escort fighters that take off early can only fly north for as many as kilometers, that is, before leaving the fleet's air defense area, the radius of the fleet's air defense area will be warm, thus greatly compressing the air defense area of ​​the US fleet. This means that the efficiency of air defense interception will inevitably be greatly reduced.

The problem is that it is difficult for the US escort fighter jets to move north in advance to reverse the situation.

The collection is very simple. The number is too small!

, Wanbibei

Although from the perspective of the battlefield situation, the advantage should be in the hands of Yin Jun. In any case, the US escort fighter jet has not yet flew far away. Behind us are large escort warships equipped with passive detection systems and early warning aircraft that patrol forward. According to the US military's combat code, early warning aircraft will not start the detection radar when patrol forward. The long-range early warning mission is undertaken by the passive detection system on the large warship. Only after a large group of incoming aircraft is discovered, the escort warship will contact the early warning aircraft. Let the early warning aircraft start the radar, illuminate the target for air defense fighters, and guide the air defense fighter to fight. Because the flight speed of the early warning aircraft is far less than that of the fighter jet, it will be deployed in advance when the fleet is in a state of combat.

, but the carrier-based early warning aircraft of the Republic's Navy cannot follow the fighter's action. However, the number is huge. In addition, the heavy fighter has a complete interception system, which can intercept multiple old long-range air-to-air missiles in a single battle, and there are only a handful of fighters that can carry many old long-range air-to-air missiles. In other words, in the air battle led by heavy fighters, the proportion of visual range outer air combat is not large. Most of the time, it will hit the visual range and determine the outcome in the form of fighting. A few days ago, the Republic's Navy had fought twice with the US Navy in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, and the two battles of both carrier-based air forces proved that in combat air combat, quantity is more important than performance.

At that time, the problems of the US military were not only small.

Because of the dispatch of many reconnaissance aircraft, the number of air defense fighters in the US fleet has always been relatively small. In order to ensure that a considerable number of fighter aircraft groups can always be maintained over the fleet, the size of the aircraft group can only be compressed. More importantly, after the US commander issued a combat readiness order, the aircraft carriers were adjusted to the air defense fighters. In order to ensure that the fighters parked on the flight deck could take off at the fastest speed, the US fleet's air defense fighters were sent out by; aircraft carriers, rather than being dispatched by 2 to 3 aircraft carriers as before. In other words, the portable fighters belong to 7 air wings. When these fighters rushed to the battlefield, they naturally formed 7 formations in a three-air formation and two formations, and the interval between each formation exceeded 10,000 meters.

The result is conceivable. When encountering fighter jets sent by the Republic Fleet, the US fighter jets were very dispersed.

When there are few fighter jets in the garrison, the number of US fighter jets is pitifully small.

Of course, the US military's combat rights have an advantage that a Republic's fighter cannot have: fighting on its back.

To put it bluntly, if you cannot defeat your opponent, you can withdraw the fleet air defense circle. As long as you do not enter the inner air defense circle of the fleet, you will not be attacked by the fleet air defense system. The Republic fighter jets that follow into the US fleet air defense circle will definitely be attacked.

That's exactly that, after the encounter between the two sides, the Republic's Navy fighter in the first wave of attack aircraft group immediately launched the anti-ship missiles it carried in advance. Because it was more than a thousand meters away from the aircraft carrier in the US fleet at that time, the fighter in the first wave of attack aircraft group could only use anti-ship missiles to attack the escort warships located in the north of the US fleet, and then accelerated to meet the US fighter. After a round of war, the remaining US fighter jets immediately retreated and retreated into the fleet's air defense circle. Although, under the circumstances at that time, the fighter jets in the first wave of attack aircraft group did not need to chase after, and as long as they stayed outside the fleet's air defense circle, they would not be attacked, but the range of heavy anti-ship missiles carried by the fighter jets was about 1,000 meters, and the US fleet's air defense circle was the most

The large interception radius is also persuading about 1,000 meters. More importantly, after being attacked in air, that is, entering the air defense state, the fleet will definitely expand its range of activities, that is, the escort warships must distance themselves from the protected objects, and must maintain a distance of at least a force of more than 1,000 meters, and in many cases, it will even be expanded to 1,000 meters. In this way, the second wave of attack aircraft group that serves as the main force can only launch missiles at a distance of more than 1,000 meters away from the US aircraft carrier, which is difficult to pose a threat to the US aircraft carrier. More importantly, US fighter jets retreating into the fleet's air defense circle can use the remaining air-to-air missiles to intercept anti-ship missiles. In any case, no anti-ship missile is equipped with an expensive interception system, so anti-ship missiles do not have the ability to fight against air-to-air missiles.

Affected by this, even though they knew that they would take a lot of risks, the fighters of the first wave of attack aircraft group rushed in.

It must be admitted that technological progress has brought great benefits to both offense and defense.

As mentioned earlier, in the new round of technological revolution, the benefits gained by one side of defense are more than the attacking party; therefore, the war is moving towards a direction that is beneficial to the defenders. A little...

This situation is very obvious in fleet air defense operations.

If at the beginning of the century, when our fighter jets are located in the attack area, the fleet's air defense system will definitely be affected and even cannot work normally. In this regard, the US Navy even has a clear regulation that carrier-based fighter jets are only responsible for air defense operations outside the area. If the anti-ship missiles launched by enemy planes or enemy planes enter the air defense area, the carrier-based fighter jets will not be surprised to pursue, and they cannot even use fire-controlled radar to illuminate the target to avoid interference to the fleet's air defense system. Relatively speaking, the impact of interference is nothing, and the real problem lies in the accidental strike and injury. Although fighter jets are nothing in front of warships, if the warships can be protected, even shooting down several of our fighter jets is not a big deal. However, miss strike and injury will disperse the fleet's air defense firepower and occupy the air defense fire control channel, greatly reducing the interception ability against threats.

,Ten thousand

From this perspective, if the problem of enemy-me-identification can be solved, especially in extreme combat environments, the problem of enemy-me-identification can be solved, and air defense fighters can move in the fleet's air defense area, fight with the air defense systems on the warships, and intercept incoming targets. Mo Yong doubts that this problem is not easy to solve. The traditional method of enemy-me-identification is to send a series of radio signals with special significance. After the enemy-me-identification device on the own fighter will automatically transmit another series of radios with special significance after receiving the radio signal, it will automatically transmit another series of radios with special significance.

Signal means to respond. As long as the response is correct, it is a friendly army. It can be imagined that this rather "primitive" method of identification can only be used in low-intensity wars. Not to mention being maliciously disturbed, even in a battlefield with relatively complex electromagnetic environment, the enemy and us identification signals are easily affected. This makes the identification system lose its due role, and the result is that friendly army is attacked. Not to mention on the battlefield in the mid-century, in the Gulf War many years ago, there were no decent electronic interference equipment at that time, and the Allies accidentally injured friendly army many times.

Like radio recognition systems, other electronic recognition methods are prone to interference.

end.

It was not until around the Tiannian that the engineers of the Republic took the lead in applying the "field effect principle" to the enemy-to-me recognition system to solve the world-class problem of enemy-to-me recognition. The "field effect principle" is not complicated, that is, the basic physical properties of all objects with mass have, namely gravity field and electromagnetic field. Because the field of any object is unique, the identity of the object can be determined by the field generated by the object. Because the principle is very simple, many countries, including the United States, have mastered similar technologies within several years. Of course, the "field effect principle" is not perfect, and the detection system

The limitations of overall performance, coupled with the earth itself having a gravity field and a geomagnetic field, the detection equipment that adopts the "field effect principle. The working distance of the detection equipment is very limited. Only closer objects can be detected. It is also true that the "field effect principle was applied decades after it was proposed, and it was first used in the enemy-to-week identification system. In any case, in the enemy-to-week identification system with the main purpose of avoiding accidental injuries, the requirements for induction distance are not strict. Even at some times, when it is necessary to identify distant targets, other means can be used instead of relying on the "field effect."

It is precisely because of this that the fleet's air defense operations have undergone essential changes.

Of course, this does not mean that our air defense fighter jets can rush around without worrying about our air defense system.

In any case, identification of the enemy is a process, not a purpose, so it requires a cost.

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In the peripheral air defense circle led by long-range air defense missiles, the time for enemy-to-we is nothing, but when it comes to the inner air defense circle that calculates time in milliseconds, that is, when the Ran energy weapon intercepts the incoming targets, the time it takes for enemy-to-we to identify is not so short.

To put it vividly, as for the Republic Navy's laser interception system, when dealing with a target, the continuous irradiation time is only the old milliseconds. Even if the spectroscopic system is used to illuminate the old target at the same time, the continuous irradiation time is only, and the spectroscopic system will produce energy loss. The energy transfer efficiency is probably blurred. More importantly, when the energy interception system needs to be used, the anti-ship missiles are often used. Moreover, the engine has been thrown away, leaving only the warhead and attitude control engine missiles. At this time, the speed of the anti-ship missile is basically above Limach, and the combat distance of the energy interception system is within Limach.

meter. Therefore, the reaction time left for the intercepting system is only 3 seconds. Generally, the target has to be intercepted twice in such a short time, that is, only old seconds each time, that is, milliseconds. Including damage assessment and other times, the preparation time for each fire will not exceed the total interception time, and the fierce milliseconds. It can be seen that after the interception time of tens of thousands of milliseconds, only milliseconds are left. Because the energy intercepting system does not destroy the target, but makes the target deviate from the ballistic and cannot pose a threat to the warship, the target must be shot down outside the meter of the warship joint port. Eliminating this time, there is no time for breathing in milliseconds.

It can be seen from this that in the inner air defense circle of the fleet, the interception system will not divide the enemy and us, and will intercept all the targets that enter the attack range and pose a threat to the warship. More importantly, the standard for the interception system to determine whether the target poses a threat to the warship is very simple, that is, whether the target is moving towards the warship. To be precise, whether the relative distance between the target and the warship is shortening or expanding. If it is shortening, it is a threat.

Of course, this has no effect on the battle in the fleet's outer air defense circle.

With the support of the fleet's air defense system, US fighters quickly turned the situation around and let the rampant Republic Navy fighters taste the hardship.

However, the situation has not become beneficial to the US military.

Just as the US military tried its best to intercept the Republic's Navy's fighter jets, the second wave of attack aircraft had reached a distance of more than a thousand meters north of the US fleet.

As mentioned earlier, when encountering US fighter jets, the fighter jets of the first wave of attack aircraft dropped the air defense missiles they carried on the escort warships on the periphery of the US fleet. According to some pilots' recollections, when they were fighting for air supremacy with US fighter jets, at least the US warships were hit by missiles and smoke was raised. According to the US military's combat records, the warships hit by missiles between the old points and the old points were not moved, including the patrol and worries that were carried out in the north of the fleet, the multi-purpose destroyers that were dispensed with auxiliary warning missions, and the two anti-submarine destroyers operating nearby. Because the warships were sunk and were under severe electromagnetic interference before sinking, the tactical information sent was not received by the flagship, so it is impossible to determine the specific sinking time of the four warships and how many missiles were attacked before sinking.

Judging from the situation at that time, especially the performance of the new generation of anti-ship missiles of the Republic Navy, the first one to be attacked was definitely the "Bunker Hill" cruiser located at the northmost point. According to the US military's combat record, the ship was performing air defense alert tasks with its equipped passive detection system at the beginning of the battle. Because the course of the US fleet was no, the ship was actually located in the left front of the fleet, not directly in front of the fleet. This was exactly in line with the US Navy's air defense formation, that is, when performing air defense combat missions, or first considering air threats, it should be in the direction of left and right edges in front of the fleet.

Equipped with an air defense warship with long-range alert capabilities. It provides preliminary support for carrier-based early warning aircraft in the same direction and coordinates the fleet's air defense warning mission. Although the passive detection system will not emit electromagnetic radiation, in the eyes of anti-ship missiles, a cruiser with a displacement of more than 20,000 tons is definitely the second only to the aircraft carrier. Because before launching the missile, the pilot has determined that it cannot attack the aircraft carrier, so he chose the free attack tactic, that is, when the anti-ship missile enters the final range, it no longer searches for the aircraft carrier, but instead has the most significant battleship within the exploration range of the attack seeker and is not attacked.

Relatively speaking, the outcome of that multi-purpose destroyer will not be much better.

As mentioned earlier, the US Navy did not build multi-purpose destroyers and anti-submarine destroyers on the same platform, but developed cruisers based on multi-purpose destroyers, while anti-submarine destroyers were completely new designs. In other words, the US Navy's multi-purpose destroyers are closer to cruisers than anti-submarine destroyers. Although in terms of displacement, multi-purpose destroyers are several thousand tons smaller than cruisers, they are much larger than anti-submarine destroyers, so they were saturated attacks by anti-ship missiles. Especially after the USS Bunker Hill was hit continuously by multiple missiles, the USS Brad, which cooperated with it, was named after a destroyer captain who died with the ship during the Middle East War. It must have become a missile magnet, attracting a lot of anti-ship missiles.

Because the Bunker Hill guided most of the crew members of the Brad survived, and both officers and soldiers confirmed that the warship had ignited a fire before it sank. And it is very likely that the superstructure made of lightweight materials was caused by the high temperature caused by the missile explosion, so it is roughly certain. At that time, the pilots of the Republic Navy saw these two warships. In other words, the other two anti-submarine destroyers sank after being caught. This can also be proved from the fact that there were less than famous officers and soldiers in total, and the surviving officers and soldiers were working in the upper compartment of the warship. How fragile the flag anti-submarine destroyers were in front of the anti-ship missiles of the Republic Navy.

No matter from which perspective, the greatest contribution of the first wave of attack aircraft fleet was to kill the escort warships north of the US fleet.

To be precise, it is to allow the second wave of attack aircraft to fly south for more than 1,000 meters, so as to use the anti-ship missiles it carries to attack aircraft carriers located at the core of the US fleet, especially the Bush of the Sixth Fleet located in the front left of the fleet, the aircraft carriers of the USS Madison and Buchanan are both Jefferson-class, and they are named after the presidential surname in the history of the US history. More importantly, when the first wave of attack aircraft was pursuing US fighter jets

It was also the air defense circle of the Sixth Fleet from this direction. When the second wave of attack aircraft group arrived and launched missiles, all the air defense warships in the Sixth Fleet were busy dealing with fighters in the sky, without noting the attack aircraft group in the distance. It was not until the attack aircraft group reflected the missiles and used fire-control radar to illuminate the US warships with fire control radar to provide the last target information for the anti-ship missiles that the alert system on the US air defense warships issued an alarm.

,Ten thousand

There is no doubt that it is too late to organize defense at this time.

In terms of time, even if the anti-ship missiles fly for a thousand meters, it will only take four seconds, which also includes the time spent climbing and accelerating after launch. The second wave of attack aircraft has a total of 2 old fighters. Each fighter launched 6 anti-ship missiles. That is, there are more than 0 anti-ship missiles fired at the US fleet. Later it was proved that some anti-ship missiles failed to fly to the US fleet due to failure after launching, or failed to pose a threat to the US fleet.

It is almost impossible for the Sixth Fleet to intercept so many missiles in such a short time. Faced with the influx of anti-ship missiles, the commander of the Sixth Fleet has no choice but to activate the Fleet Joint Defense System, with the help of the Fourth Fleet on the right and the air defense force of the Eighth Fleet on the right.

"The joint defense system is not mysterious. Its basic principle is to use the detection system of this ship to provide target data for air defense missiles launched by other air defense warships. It is obvious that this is also a model of network joint combat. The key to achieving this tactic is not the performance of the detection system, but the performance of air defense missiles, especially the autonomous attack capability of air defense missiles. You must know that the "Aegis" system, which was launched in the Li Century, can detect thousands of targets at the same time and track hundreds of targets. The fire control channel of air defense missiles is limited by the fire control channel of air defense missiles. If air defense missiles no longer need fire control channels, at least they do not need special fire control irradiation radars, and they can rely on the rough number provided by the detection system.

According to the fact that the air defense system is completely relied on its own detection system to search and attack targets, the performance of the air defense system is no longer limited by the fire control channel, but determined by the detection capability of the detection system. It is obvious that improving the detection capability is much more than increasing the fire control channel. It was not until the end of the century-old era that air defense missiles made great breakthroughs in "intelligence", with autonomous attack capabilities that can cope with general battlefield environments, and developed and matured within the following decade. In the years before the outbreak of World War III, that is, around the year before, the new generation of air defense missiles of the Republic and the US Navy had autonomous attack capabilities. It was not until this time that the "joint defense system" became a truly effective tactical system.

As a weapon system, there are naturally pros and cons. It is impossible to be perfect

When making full use of the fleet's air defense capabilities and greatly improving the fleet's air defense efficiency, the "joint defense system" also has a very prominent disadvantage; that is, when using Dan, all combat platforms that join the system need to activate high-speed data links, thereby releasing extremely obvious electromagnetic radiation.

There is no doubt that in front of the new anti-ship missile, the warship that activates the tactical data link is like a person holding a flashlight in a dark room, which is obvious.

In a sense, this is equivalent to dispersing the anti-ship missiles that originally focused on attacking the Sixth Fleet to other fleets.

Although theoretically speaking, this is equivalent to increasing the survival probability of each fleet. After all, the interception capacity of any fleet has an upper limit. The interception efficiency within the upper limit range is the highest. If the upper limit is exceeded, the interception efficiency will be low. If the upper limit is exceeded, the warships will definitely be hit by missiles. In other words, the fleet will definitely be much easier to deal with missiles than to deal with young missiles. Because the Eighth Fleet only has an aircraft carrier battle group. Even if it is spread out, the Sixth Fleet will have to be assigned multiple anti-ship missiles, not erotic missiles, so this metaphor is not completely accurate. However, when the number of anti-ship missiles is large enough and poses a threat to each fleet, dispersed attacks are equivalent to increasing losses.
To be continued...
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