The reason is very simple. The amphibious fleet is a fleet, not a fleet. In addition to other anti-submarine ships, such as multi-purpose destroyers and cruisers with anti-submarine combat capabilities, amphibious assault ships and amphibious landing ships with wide flight decks are ideal anti-submarine combat platforms. When necessary, amphibious assault ships can even carry dozens of anti-submarine patrol aircraft to perform anti-submarine combat missions in the middle and late stages of the war, as the attack submarine of the Republic's Navy entered the North Atlantic. Many amphibious assault ships of the US Navy played the role of escort aircraft carriers, so in amphibious fleets, the task pressure of the anti-submarine escort fleet is not high.

According to the Republic's Navy's estimate, "the amphibious fleet needs up to two anti-submarine escort fleets. Because at least two amphibious fleets are needed to ensure that the landing operation will not be affected under the circumstances of the ship. Therefore, four anti-submarine escort fleets need to be arranged to fight with the amphibious fleet. The remaining three anti-submarine escort fleets will be accompanied by the transport fleet, that is, the fleet that transports materials and equipment to the beachhead positions after the Marines land. Although this cannot be guaranteed to be foolproof. The straight-line distance from Naha to Guam is only about 4,000 meters. If some long-range maritime patrol aircraft with patrol radius of more than 3,400 meters are deployed in the Ryukyu Islands, and some patrol aircraft with water take-off and landing capabilities are deployed to the landing site, it can effectively make up for the shortcomings of the anti-submarine escort fleet and minimize the losses on the route.

In fact, these concerns are a bit redundant.

As we all know, when the Marine Corps lands, there must be a fleet nearby responsible for seizing sea and air supremacy. It also provides air support and artillery support to the Marine Corps. There are a large number of anti-submarine warships in any fleet. In fact, the largest number of anti-submarine warships in the fleet is anti-submarine warships, and there are a large number of anti-submarine patrol aircraft on the aircraft carrier. The anti-submarine cover distance of the fleet is generally hundreds of kilometers. The anti-submarine cover distance of some large fleets is even more than a concave kilometers. In addition, attack submarines that accompany the fleet, etc., so the anti-submarine activities of the amphibious fleet and the transport fleet activities are

The submarine power will never be much worse. It has the ability to attack submarines with amphibious fleets and transport fleets. Most of them have the ability to attack fleets with aircraft carriers as the core. Mu Yong doubts that any submarine will shoot torpedoes at the aircraft carrier, rather than at the amphibious warships. From a practical perspective, the Republic's Navy will definitely learn from the experience of landing operations on the Kamchatka Peninsula. It deploys maritime bases to the front line, and the anti-submarine capacity of maritime bases cannot be underestimated. In addition, Shanghai bases are more likely to become targets of submarine attacks, so near the landing ground, the role of anti-submarine escort fleets is very limited.

It can be said that what really needs an anti-submarine escort fleet is the maritime transportation line connecting the landing ground and the rear port.

From the perspective of preventing the Republic's army from capturing the Mariana Islands, the US military, in addition to desperately fighting with the Republic's Navy for the islands' sea and air supremacy, must try to prevent the Marines from going ashore, or make the Marines unable to exert their full strength after going ashore.

In this way, the US military has enough reason to place attack submarines on the route of the Republic's Navy transport fleet, rather than fighting with the Republic's Navy at the landing ground.

, King of Looks

It can be said that this is the main reason why the Republic's Navy repeatedly delayed its landing operations.

You should know that when the Republic's shipyards were desperately building anti-submarine warships, the United States shipyards were working overtime to build new attack submarines. Although the construction cycle of submarines was much longer, the US military had sent attack submarines left in the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, activated several submarine marines in Pearl Harbor, and also requisitioned several ports in Australia that could provide support for submarines.

Conservatively estimated that by the end of April, more than qin submarines in the Pacific will be active, and half of them will be concentrated in the Philippine Sea west of Guam.

In other words, in this sea area where the east and west are less than kilometer wide, less than red-mouth kilometers long from north to south, and an area of ​​about 00,000 square kilometers, there are at least powerful US attack submarines waiting for opportunities. If we include the same number of attack submarines invested by the Republic's Navy and the attack submarines that are fighting with the main fleets of the two countries' naval forces, the number of submarines in this area is more than blades, and the density is scary! For example, if submarines are deployed in the Pacific Ocean at the same density, the two sides will need to invest about 0 female submarines in total. During the entire war, there were not many submarines built by the Navy and the State, and during the entire war, there were only a few submarines built by the United States.
Chapter completed!