The signs of struggle are obvious, but the global news media are speculating that the war is about to break out.

Major news media hired well-known people to comment on the upcoming "South Asian War". Most commentators believed that the war would break out around the 15th. First, Pakistan declared war on India, and the Republic immediately declared war on India in accordance with the alliance treaty. The two countries will defeat the Indian Air Force, which has not yet recovered within 24 to hours, and seize air supremacy on the battlefield. Pakistan will mainly fight on the western battlefield, striving to capture the Indian-controlled Kashmir region as soon as possible. In addition to providing necessary support to Pakistan, the Republic will concentrate its main forces on the eastern battlefield, strive to recover southern Tibet within 115 days and complete ground combat operations.

For India, to avoid war, action must be taken before the 15th.

Among many news comments, nn's report is the most popular because everyone knows that nn is closely related to cia, and its reports are mostly related to cia.

According to NN's report, the war will not break out before the 20th.

To prove this, n~ specially hired retired Air Force Major General John Pkins, who had participated in the construction of the "National Missile Defense System", as a special commentator, and gave a comprehensive introduction to the combat methods and combat effectiveness of the "air-based laser interception system" and "ground-based missile interception system" provided to Pakistan by the Republic.

Both the "air-based laser interception system" and the "ground missile interception system" belong to the "missile defense system", and the key force of the "missile defense system" is not the interception ability, but the detection ability. Although the flight trajectory of the ballistic missile is relatively fixed, even the ballistic missile has detectability, but the flight trajectory of the ballistic missile is relatively high and the flight speed is faster: it can hit the target within minutes to ten minutes. Whether the incoming ballistic missile can be detected in a timely and accurate manner determines the interception result.

Detection capabilities are the bottleneck of the "missile interception system".

Being able to destroy ballistic missiles before they are launched is naturally the ideal defense method. Because most medium and short-range ballistic missiles adopt the launch method of maneuvering deployment, even if the attacking party has absolute air supremacy, it is difficult to destroy all enemy ballistic missiles. The "missile interception system" generally does not target ballistic missiles that have not been launched. The Republic and Pakistan are not absolutely sure that they can destroy all ballistic missiles in India after the war begins.

If a missile cannot be destroyed on the ground, it can only be intercepted after it is launched.

In this case, the local method is to destroy the ballistic missiles after they have been launched. They are also destroyed in the "boost-up" stage. Because the range of Indian intermediate-range ballistic missiles exceeds 1,500 kilometers and can be deployed behind the front line. The maximum range of the "air-based laser interception system" and "ground-based missile interception system" in the Republic is only 500 kilometers and 250 kilometers. Even if the Republic and Pakistan can seize air supremacy within 24 hours, it cannot prevent India from launching nuclear-headed ground-based ballistic missiles within 24 hours. Therefore, it is difficult for the "missile interception system" provided by the Republic to pose a threat to the "boost-up" Indian missiles.

After the ballistic missile leaves the atmosphere, it enters the "middle road".

Although it is not impossible to intercept out-of-field ballistic missiles in the atmosphere. The Republic's "National Strategic Defense System" and the United States' "National Missile Defense System" can intercept ground space targets (including missiles and satellites) at altitudes below 500 kilometers. However, the Republic has not provided the "outer space interception capability" ground defense system to Pakistan and India's "firefire" and "firefire" medium-range ballistic missiles with both ground "middle-range ballistics" are above 25c kilometers. It is impossible to intercept Indian ground ballistic missiles at this stage.

At this point, the ballistic missile can only be intercepted when it enters the "re-entry ballistic" stage.

The ground interception test was conducted from the 9th to the 11th. All targeted the "reentering atmosphere ballistics" to prove that the Republic has limited capabilities for the "missile interception system" provided to Pakistan.

At this stage. Interception time is calculated in seconds!

Because of the adoption of "elastomer separation technology", the reentry velocity of India's 2 medium-range ballistic missiles is above Mach 20. From 150 kilometers (maximum height of the atmosphere) to the ground, up to 3c! Within these 30, not only should the missile (warhead) be discovered and tracked, but the interception is also required. The difficulty can be imagined.

According to the data provided by Hopkins, 6-sets of "air-based laser interception systems" and 3 "ground-based missile interception systems" can only provide Pakistan with the most basic "strategic security guarantee".

In ideal cases, that is, the target ballistics have been mastered and the target data is determined as soon as possible, the "air-based laser interception system" needs to continuously illuminate the target by 1 to ensure destruction; before intercepting the second target, the "air-based laser interception system" requires about 5 cooling and re-targeting time. That is to say, within 30, one "air-based laser interception system" can only intercept at most 2 targets.

The combat mode of the "ground-based missile interception system" is different from that of the "air-based laser interception system". In general combat mode, when the target enters the atmosphere, the "ground-based missile interception system" will launch two interception missiles at the same time to carry out the target's sequential operation mode.

Intercept. The interception system then automatically detects the interception situation. If the interception system has already broken down the system automatically searches for the second batch of targets. If the target is not destroyed, the interception system will launch the second batch of missiles and conducts a second round of interception on the target. Because each "ground-based missile interception system" has 6 fire control channels, 6 targets can be intercepted at the same time. With an 80% chance of destruction, 9 to 1c targets can be intercepted at a time.

By this calculation, the "missile interception system" provided by the Republic to Pakistan can only intercept at most one missile.

Objectively speaking, the interception capability is not bad. The United States' "national missile defense system" also intercepts up to 150 targets at the same time.

The key is how to detect and discover targets.

According to the information provided by Hopkins, the "Long-range alert radar" deployed by the Republic in Quetta, Pakistan is a real "strategic missile surveillance detection and early warning radar". It uses ultra-long wave frequency bands and has a maximum effective detection distance of more than meter. It can accurately locate the launch status of the ballistic missile within 3,000 kilometers and calculate the missile's flight trajectory within 30 after the launch of the ballistic missile, providing at least 5 minutes of early warning time for interception work.

In order to play a role, the "air-based laser interception" and "ground-based missile interception system" must rely on the target parameters provided by the "strategic missile surveillance detection and early warning radar". To this end, the Republic has established five "missile early warning centers" in the northeast, northwest, southwest, Hainan and southeast respectively.

Although the "strategic missile surveillance detection and early warning radar" that was originally deployed regularly has the capability of maneuvering deployment, due to the limitations of the radar working system, the radar antenna is very large in size and even if it can be airlifted, it will take a lot of time to assemble and debug.

According to Hopkin's speculation, the data in the missile interception test conducted from the 9th to 11th were provided by the radar deployed by the Republic in the northwest and southwest, rather than by the radar deployed in Quetta. Even if the Republic's engineers are responsible for the assembly and commissioning of the radar, it will take 0 days to make the radar work properly.

In this way, Pakistan will obtain real missile defense capabilities before the 20th.

If the Republic wants to incite Pakistan to launch a war, it must provide Pakistan with sufficient strategic security guarantees.

Judging from the logistics preparations between the Republic and Bucky, the war will not break out before the 20th.

Although the Republic has the strategic airlift capability in the world second only to the United States, its huge transport aircraft fleet can transport tens of thousands of tons of combat materials to the front line every day. With limited purpose, the Republic will not invest too many ground combat troops in order to seize air supremacy. The Republic's Air Force must fully dispatch high-value strategic targets such as air bases, air defense positions, strategic command centers, and communication centers across India for bombing. The material consumption within 2 after the outbreak of the war will not be less than 500,000 tons of ground combat operations, and possible unexpected situations. The Republic must transport 1 to 1.5 million tons of combat materials to the front line before the outbreak of the war.

The entire material transportation work will last for more than one week and will be completed around the 17th.

It also takes time to assemble and mobilize troops. During the material and equipment stage, transport aircraft undertake a large number of tasks, while the ground forces invested by the Republic are mainly airborne troops and air assault troops, and require sufficient air transport capabilities. In this way, it is impossible for the Republic to launch a war in the logistics preparation stage.

Based on these factors, Hopkins concluded that the war would only break out on the 20th at the earliest.

Almost no one is pregnant with Hopkins' analysis because he represents the CIA and the Pentagon in the United States.

Faced with the "provocation" between the Republic and Pakistan, India actively carried out diplomatic activities while preparing for war.

On the afternoon of the 11th, Rurajapani issued the highest combat readiness order, and more than 1.7 million Indian soldiers entered a state of war.

On the same day, the Indian representative to the United Nations strongly condemned the military provocations between the Republic and Pakistan at the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly, hoping that the Security Council could make positive contributions to maintaining peace and stability in South Asia. Because it was opposed by the Republic, the proposal of the Indian representative was not adopted by the Security Council.

On the 12th, Rurajapani ordered the troops deployed at the Bernighal Pass to voluntarily retreat kilometers.

The artillery battle that lasted for one day was over hastily ended, but the Pakistani army did not give up. On the night of the 12th, Pakistani ground troops crossed the actual ceasefire line between the two sides and occupied the southern position of the Yamaguchi, which was originally controlled by the Indian army.

On the 13th, Rurajapani summoned the Republic's ambassador to India, hoping to hold the fifth round of negotiations on the "Border Issues in Southern Tibet" as soon as possible, and hinted that India could make appropriate concessions on certain major issues.

India's peace signal was not rewarded. In response to India's diplomatic notes, Republic's Foreign Minister Yan Shanglong clearly mentioned that unless India voluntarily withdraws its troops deployed in southern Tibet and recognizes that the "traditional line" is the actual border between the two sides, the Republic will not have too much hope for negotiations.
Chapter completed!